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This paper proposes an explanation of the puzzling coexistence of elements of inertia and
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Non-technical summary
This paper proposes a model of the Russian labour market that captures elements of inertia
and dynamism. From the rich empirical literature devoted to the Russian labour market, four
major features emerge as essential: pervasive labour hoarding, the importance of social assets,
mounting wage arrears, and the important mobility of some workers. The first two features
can be interpreted as elements of inertia, the last two as elements of flexibility.
To our knowledge, there is no theoretical explanation of this contrasted picture. We propose a
model of segmentation based on uncertainty and workers’ heterogeneity and risk aversion. At
the beginning of the period, firms offer their workers a contract which includes a low
monetary wage and the access to social services. Workers chose to accept the contract or to
leave the firm, depending on their outside opportunities, which in turn depend on their
productive characteristics. The contract plays the role of an insurance against the risk faced by
workers on the labour market. It is in the interest of the firm to keep workers with this
contract rather than hiring new workers on the competitive market because of the ex ante
uncertainty about future shocks and about the productivity of employees. The choice of the
workers give rise to an ex post segmentation of the market whereby the most productive
workers leave their initial firm, contract on the spot labour market, and concentrate in the best
performing firms. In the meantime, however, less productive workers remain in both types of
firms.
This notion of segmentation, or duality, differs from the usual two sector models of transition
where firms are contrasted according to their type of ownership, i.e. whether they are
privatised or still state owned (Blanchard, 1997). Moreover, both segments of our model
jointly exist within the same firm since good firms employ both types of workers. This aspect
is to be contrasted with the intersectoral segmentation observed in developing countries
(Harris and Todaro, 1970). On the other hand, our framework is related to the literature on
labour tying contracts (Bardhan, 1984) that describes rural relations between landowners and
peasants in developing economies. The duality that we put in evidence differs from traditional
segmentation models (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) which oppose a primary segment wherein
workers are stable and receive contractual compensation and a secondary segment composed
of mobile workers paid at a competitive wage. The specificity of our setting is that workers of
the primary segment have less demanded qualifications and receive lower wages than workers
of the secondary segment.
According to the vision supported by the model, one should observe the following signs of the
segmentation process in the former state sector : (i) The employment of the most productive
workers should be more sensitive to shocks than the employment of the less productive
wokers. In other words, the adjustment variable of firms is the employment of high-productivity workers. (ii) In certain cases wages of low productivity workers should be less
sensitive to local labour market conditions than wages of high productivity workers. (iii) One
should observe more intra-firm wage dispersion in firms facing positive shocks than in firms
facing negative shocks. The former will indeed have more productive workers paid at their
marginal productivity while unproductive workers are paid a unique contractual wage.
In order to test some of the predictions of the model we use  a panel of 13410 firms extracted
from the Russian enterprise Registry data base. We use the variation in the volume of firms'
output as a proxy for their idiosyncratic shocks : a firm whose production expands has
certainly faced a favourable shock, whereas a firm whose production contracts has probably
faced a negative productivity shock. We use the distinction white collar workers/blue collar
workers as a proxy for low productivity/high productivity workers (this is in conformity with
the stylized facts presented in the paper, according to which blue collar workers are the most
demanded employees, while white collar workers are the less adapted to the new market
environment). To be sure, such a distinction does not encompass all characteristics of the
employees in terms of their mobility and external opportunities.
As expected, the results show that firms are reacting to their shocks by adjusting the number
of blue collar workers rather than the number of white collar workers. Also, the results show
that local labour market conditions have significantly more influence on the wages of blue
collar workers than on the wages of white collar workers.
The implications of this segmentation phenomenon in terms of restructuring are ambiguous.
On the one hand, it reflects some adjustment of the industrial sector, namely dynamic
employment policy of some firms and efficient reallocation of the most productive workers.
On the other hand, if restructuring means reducing overmanning, then the process is far from
being completed in Russia. There is a risk that this stagnant segment exerts an eviction effect
on the dynamic sector, in particular if it receives State subsidies in order to perform his role of
social protection. The presence of social assets in former State firms also increases the entry
cost of de novo firms. De facto, many newly created private firms do propose social services
to their employees. This constraint certainly slows down the development of the new private
sector.
This peculiar segmentation of the labour market is due to the weakness of the institutional
construction. It is above all linked to the high level of uncertainty that surrounds the
perspectives of workers and firms. In terms of the model presented in the paper, the real
Russian specificity, compared to other transition countries, or to market economies, is the
uncertainty associated with the cost of leaving the firm. Uncertainty is more important in
Russia because of the weaker institutions and the more fluctuating macroeconomic policy.
The weakness of the State and of the rule of law and the slow pace of institution building in
Russia shorten the time horizon of agents and weaken the quality of their expectations. The
reduction of uncertainty thus constitutes a key condition of the ''normalization'' of the
situation, and of the separation of low productivity employees from their firm.Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian
Labour Market: A model of segmentation¤ .
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Abstract
This paper proposes an explanation of the puzzling coexistence of
elements of inertia and dynamism on the Russian labour market using
a segmentation model. Risk averse workers are di¤erentiated accord-
ing to their productivity. They face a trade-o¤ between wages and
access to social services provided by the …rm. The most productive
workers leave their initial …rm, contract on the spot labour market,
and concentrate in the best performing …rms. The model provides a
possible interpretation of wage arrears which can be viewed as an ele-
ment of animplicit contract between…rms and less productive workers.
We test some of the predictions of the model using a panel dataset
containing 13 410 …rms, for 1993 - 1997.
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11 Introduction
The labour market is part of the often alleged ”Russian di¤erence”. Com-
pared to other countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slo-
vakia or Slovenia, one of the original features of Russia is the relative inelas-
ticity of employment to the level of activity. In Central Europe, employment
has generally followed the decline of output. In Russia, the aggregate level
of employment has fallen by only 15 percent while output was almost cut by
45 percent between 1991 and 1997 (EBRD, 1998)1.
This has been interpreted in two radically opposite ways. On the one side,
the apparent irresponsiveness of the labour demand has been attributed to
the lack of enterprise restructuring, labour lay-o¤s being considered as a re-
structuring measure typical of …rms’ early adjustment. This interpretation
points to the drawbacks of the privatisation strategy, dominated by politi-
cal objectives, which has transferred the control of enterprises to insiders 2.
Those have poor incentives to restructure and discourage external investors
whose property rights are poorly protected (Blanchard and Aghion, 1996,
Frydman et al., 1996). Institutional features of the labour market (high
separation and hiring costs) are also taken as responsible for the weak in-
centives to shed labour (Garibaldi and Brixiova, 1998). The unwillingness
of local governments to accept high levels of regional unemployment and the
related ongoing subsidies and soft budget constraints, also support the status
quo in terms of labour relations3. Finally, Friebel and Guriev (1999) argue
in a recent paper that regional mobility and hence restructuring are reduced
by the strategy of …rms who use social assets to attach the most productive
workers.
On the other side, some authors have interpreted the relative stability of
employment as a sign that the Russian labour market is highly competitive
and ‡exible (Kapeliushnikov, 1997), ” a neo-classical dream ” according to
Layard and Richter (1994). If labour contracts are adjusted and labour
1For the analysis of the output fall see Blanchard and Kramer (1997), Roland and
Verdier (1999) and Calvo and Coricelli (1993). O¢cial …gures do not take the shadow
economy into account. According to Johnson et al. (1997), the share of the shadow
economy in Russia increased from 12 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 41.6 per cent in 1995.
By contrast, in Poland the shadow sector declined, according to their estimations, from
15.7% to 12.6% of GDP in the same period of time.
2For the description of the Russian privatisation strategy see Boycko et al. (1995).
3Gaddy and Ikes (1998) suggest that managers’ ”relational capital” can be used as a
substitute to restructuring.
2reallocated with no delay in response to various shocks of the transition, it
is natural that the aggregate level of employment remains fairly stable.
Is the Russian economy rigid or highly ‡exible? Has restructuring not
started yet or is it already happening at a fast pace? We believe that each
of these two views is relevant to a certain extent, but fails to capture the
whole picture of the Russian labour market. To date, there is no theoretical
explanation of this contrasted picture of the Russian labour market. The
objective of this paper is to propose a model of the Russian labour market
that encompasses both elements of inertia and dynamism.
The model is based on the presence of uncertainty and workers’ hetero-
geneity and risk aversion. At the beginning of the period, …rms o¤er their
workers a contract which includes a low monetary wage and the access to
social services. Workers choose to accept the contract or to leave the …rm,
depending on their outside opportunities, which in turn depend on their pro-
ductive characteristics. The contract plays the role of an insurance against
the risk faced by workers on the labour market. Firms cannot …re workers
and can simply incite them to leave by o¤ering a more or less attractive
wage. It is also in the interest of the …rm to keep workers with this contract
rather than hiring new workers on the competitive market because of the
ex ante uncertainty about future shocks and the productivity of employees.
The choice of the workers give rise to an ex post segmentation of the market
whereby the most productive workers leave their initial …rm, contract on the
spot labour market, and concentrate in the best performing …rms. In the
meantime, however, less productive workers remain in both types of …rms.
This notion of segmentation, or duality, di¤ers from the usual two sector
models of transition where …rms are contrasted according to their type of
ownership, i.e. whether they are privatised or still state owned (Blanchard,
1997). Moreover, both segments of our model jointly exist within the same
…rm since good …rms employ both types of workers. This aspect is to be con-
trasted with the intersectoral segmentation observed in developing countries
(Harris and Todaro, 1970). On the other hand, our framework is related
to the literature on labour tying contracts (Bardhan, 1984) that describes
rural relations between landowners and peasants in developing economies.
In such models, landowners can ensure themselves against climatic and sea-
sonal variations, by proposing low wage long term labour tying contracts to
peasants. During peak seasons or high harvest times, they occasionally sat-
isfy their additional labour needs by hiring more workers, with short term
contracts, on the spot market. The duality that we put in evidence also dif-
3fers from traditional segmentation models (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) which
oppose a primary segment wherein workers are stable and receive contractual
compensation and a secondary segment composed of mobile workers paid at
a competitive wage. The speci…city of our setting is that workers of the
primary segment have less demanded quali…cations and receive lower wages
than workers of the secondary segment.
The next section present the majour stylised facts of the Russian labour
market, illustrating more precisely the ambivalence of the Russian labour
market. We then try, in section 3, to capture the duality of the Russian
labour market in a model of segmentation. Section 4 illustrates this vision
using the Russian enterprise Registry database4 from which we extract a
panel of 13 410 …rms observed from 1993 to 1997. Section 5 concludes.
2 Salient features of the Russian labour mar-
ket
From the rich empirical literature devoted to the Russian labour market, four
majour features emerge as essential: pervasive labour hoarding, the impor-
tance of social assets, mounting wage arrears, and the important mobility
of some workers. The …rst two features can be interpreted as elements of
inertia, the last two as elements of ‡exibility.
2.1 Elements of inertia
Pervasive labour hoarding, acknowledged by most Russian …rms (Aukut-
sionek and Kapeliushnikov, 1996)5, is obviously associated with the relative
inelasticity of employment to the variation in output. Garibaldi and Brixiova
(1998) relate the pervasive labour hoarding in Russian …rms to labour market
institutions such as high search and hiring costs and the legislation limiting
social plans. In the same spirit, Aukutsionek and Kapeliushnikov (1996) and
Commander et al. (1998) underline the political obstacles to lay-o¤s, such
as the reluctance of managers to create con‡icts with local governments un-
4The information is collected by the Russian Statistical Committee (Goskomstat) on a
compulsory and regular basis.
5In the survey of enterprises realised by the authors the average level of labour hoarding
acknowledged by the …rms is 20%.
4willing to allow large open unemployment6, as well as with the employees.
Brown (1998) points at information asymmetries and coordination problems
which make rational for a given …rm to hoard labour when all other …rms do
and thereby increase hiring costs.
The reluctance of …rms to divest their social assets can also be viewed
as an element of rigidity. In the Soviet period, a large amount of social
services was provided by …rms to their employees. They included housing,
catering, kindergartens, clinics, sanatoriums, transportation, sport and vaca-
tion resorts, and retirement bene…ts. These services were proposed at highly
subsidized prices by …rms which, in turn, used to receive transfers from local
government to cover these costs (Commander and Schankerman, 1997)7. As
the system of social protection has not been reformed, employees are still
dependent on their …rm for the provision of social services. They can also
bene…t from the access, inside …rms buildings, to subsidised sales of foodstu¤
and basic consumption goods. Even though …rms have been allowed and en-
couraged to divest social assets, most of them, especially the larger ones, have
kept them to a signi…cant extent (Commander et al., 1998). The subsidis-
ation of food and other integrated services also goes on, probably because
…rms have been able to preserve their relations with the former suppliers
without having to pay the increased costs of the new distribution chains. In
the context of uncertain outside opportunities, these assets certainly provide
incentives to remain in the …rm.
2.2 Signs of ‡exibility
In spite of these factors of rigidity, elements of ‡exibility are also important.
For instance, the high variability of wages compensates for the relative sta-
bility of employment levels. In average, Russian wages have lost 70 per cent
of their purchasing power between 1989 and 1996 (not taking arrears into
account) while in the same period, in Central European countries, real wages
fell by no more than 30 per cent (Garibaldi, Brixiova, 1998). The variability
of real wages takes two original forms in Russia.
First, …rms frequently adjust the number of working hours of their sta¤
6The law allows local governements and trade unions to suspend massive redundancies.
The recent bankruptcy law also foresees that any liquidation plan which can be expected
to provoke massive lay-o¤s can be delayed for six months.
7The authors report that about 25% of housing, health and education services to the
population were provided by …rms.
5(and accordingly their wages). For instance, they often impose compulsory,
unpaid leaves to their employees. According to Gimpelson and Lippoldt
(1997), unpaid leaves had touched 12 per cent of the employed labour force
in 1997, with an average duration of 40 days.
Second, wage arrears constitute another important modality of real wage
reduction. Mounting spectacularly since 1994, accumulated wage arrears are
reported by Earle and Sabirianova (1998) to have reached 8 billion dollars in
1997, amounting on average to 3 monthly wages in the concerned …rms, and
touching 62 per cent of the households surveyed by the RLMS8 survey. Var-
ious studies show that the allocation of wage arrears is di¤erentiated across
employees and that they tend to fall systematically on the same persons.
Desai and Idson (1998) consider that …rms use wage arrears as a device to
di¤erentiate real wages e¤ectively paid to their employees, in order to pre-
serve the real wage of the best employees, so that each employee gets paid
exactly the amount necessary to retain him in the …rm. In the same spirit,
Earle and Sabirianova (1998) suggest that …rms use wage arrears in a dis-
criminating way against the most capital speci…c employees. Lehman et al.
(1998) claim that …rms allocate wage arrears to the most stable employees.
All these analysisshare the idea that wage arrearsare used asa di¤erentiation
device.
In addition to the adjustment of real wages, recent studies also reveal a
signi…cant quantity adjustment on the Russian labour market. In spite of
labour hoarding and the attraction of social assets, gross ‡ows of hirings and
separations seem to be important on the labour market. As documented by
Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1997), the turnover rate of labour9 reached 50 per
cent in 1997, which is exceptionally high for an economy in transition (the
turnover rate was 42 per cent in Poland and 24 per cent in Romania in the
same year) and is close to levels typical of OECD countries (60 per cent on
average in the OECD, and 67 per cent in the United States).
Labour turnover is dominated by job to job change and by voluntary sep-
arations rather than lay-o¤s which represent less than 8 per cent of the cases
of separations (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1997). This last feature constitutes
another Russian speci…city. In other transition economies, lay-o¤s have been
8The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey is a periodic, nationally conducted
households survey, launched in 1992, embracing a sample of about 9000 individuals from
randomly selected households.
9The turnover rate is calculated as the ratio of hirings and separations over the total
stock of employment in a given period.
6much more frequent.
An important observation is that this high mobility is uneven across em-
ployees. Empirical studies show a di¤erentiation of behaviour that opposes
very mobile blue collars, and more immobile white collars10. Other factors
such as quali…cation, age and local labour market conditions also play a dif-
ferentiating role. More quali…ed, younger, urban workers are much more
mobile (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1997).
Labour mobility is also di¤erentiated across …rms. Smaller …rms, and
those in better …nancial situation, have a more active employment policy.
They more often use short term contracts and hire younger, more quali…ed
workers (Denisova et al., 1998). By contrast, …rms which experience …nan-
cial di¢culties keep their employees for longer periods of time, and employ
persons over the retirement age.
3 A segmentation model
To our knowledge, there is no theoretical explanation of this puzzling coex-
istence of dynamism and inertia, even though it has been empirically docu-
mented, e.g. by Gimpelson and Lippoldt (1997), Lippoldt and Grey (1997)
and Clarke (1998). As noted in the previous section, most of the existing
theoretical literature essentially sheds light on workers immobility by ana-
lyzing wage arrears, pervasive labour hoarding and the role of social assets.
We propose a vision of the Russian labour market which encompasses both
the immobility of certain employees and the high mobility of others. In our
setting, agents are heterogenous and face a high degree of uncertainty. We
show that given the institutional constraints faced by …rms and employees,
the latter can enter into two di¤erent types of contract. This generates a
segmentation of the labour market.
3.1 Transition, shocks and uncertainty
One can think of the transition as a series of exogenous shocks. Some of
these shocks are macroeconomic, e.g. credit crunch or aggregate output ‡uc-
tuations. Some shocks are idiosyncratic. Firm speci…c demand shocks derive
from the change in its trade relations, for instance, the collapse of the CMEA
10The turnover and replacement rates of blue collar workers are twice as high as those
of white collar workers.
7and the disruption of state orders in 1991, the competition of imported goods
on the domestic market and the change in consumers demand. Idiosyncratic
supply shocks relate to the change in the cost of the inputs used by the …rm,
for example the large swings in the price of energy. Workers speci…c shocks
concern the …t between their skills and the new requirements of the market.
The pervasiveness of idiosyncratic shocks implies that agents live in a
world of uncertainty. For instance, …rms ignore whether their managers,
employees, organisation, installed capital and production techniques will be
adapted to their new competitive environment after the shocks occur. Con-
cerning the quality of their employees, the uncertainty comes from the fact
that the skills developed by workers in a context of administrative coordina-
tion can prove useless in a decentralised market.
Employees themselves are confronted with uncertainty, which mainly con-
cern the availability and the value of job opportunities on the newly emerging
labour market. Another important element of uncertainty is related to the
social protection system. When leaving his …rm, an employee does not know
exactly what level or kind of social services he will be able to …nd in other
…rms and at what cost. From the point of view of the employee, a certain
level of risk is thus associated with quitting the …rm.
We consider that the transition process can be divided into many sub-
periods each of which is dominated by a set of shocks. For instance, the
aftermath of liberalisation is dominated by the radical change in relative
prices, the next period is dominated by the reallocation of resources impulsed
by privatisation etc. The whole transition process can thus be viewed as
a series of shocks which trigger a change in the market valuation of the
characteristics of the agents. The important point is that agents have to
take decisionsand start actionsin the beginning of the period, before knowing
exactly the nature of the shocks that will a¤ect their characteristics.
3.1.1 Uncertainty and the …rm: productivity shocks
Consider an economy with N initially identical …rms. Each …rm has a stock
of physical capital K and employs l0 workers so that the total labour force
is L = Nl0. Each worker supplies inelastically one unit of time.
Firms (managers) face two types of changes and uncertainty. The …rst
one concerns supply and demand idiosyncratic shocks that we represent as
a¤ecting the production technology. More precisely, we suppose that at the
beginningof the period, each …rmfacesa technology production function Q =
8MinfAK;lg where A is a productivity parameter subject to an idiosyncratic
shock and distributed in [A;A] according to a cumulative H(:); with H(A) =
0 and H(A) = 1:
The second type of uncertainty faced by the …rms relates to the pro-
ductivity of their employees. We consider that workers learn their potential
productivity (or units of e¢cient labour they are able to provide) a at the
beginning of the period. This, however, remains private information to them,
and the …rm only knows that the skills of her workers are distributed in [0;a]
according to a cumulative F(:) with F(a) = l0: (A particular case that we
will use in the sequel is the uniform distribution on [0;l0]). It is important to
stress that a is not to be taken as the technical productivity of the employee
but rather as a measure of his relative adaptation to the new requirements of
the market. The informational asymmetry concerning this parameter stems
from the fact that …rms have only been able to observe their employees in
the task they used to perform before the shock. They ignore how they will
…t a new environment, new tasks etc. The employee, however, knows his
characteristics and is thus able to anticipate his performance in the new
environment.
3.1.2 Uncertainty and the employees: the role of social assets
As observed in section 2.1, socialist …rms used to provide various social ser-
vices to their employees out of social assets they had at their disposal. Gen-
erally, one may think of any non pecuniary bene…ts provided by …rms to
their workers as a part of an employment package. We suppose that all …rms
have a stock S of social assets built up before the transition which can still
be used at little cost during the transition process11.
We assume that there is a cost to workers, denoted by ¾; of shifting from
their initial …rm to another …rm. The shifting cost ¾ can be interpreted in a
narrow sense, as the search cost that an employee who leaves his …rm must
assume in order to …nd a new provider of the social services he needs, or,
in a more general sense, as the cost of changing workplace. It re‡ects the
adjustment cost of moving from one location to another, the cost of adapting
to a new environment and the possible mismatch between the social services
11The cost of providing social services is low because the …xed cost of social assets has
already been paid in the past, and because the …rm continues to receive subsidies from
various levels of the government. For a discussion of the reason why these assets are not
taken in charge by the governement itself, see Commander and Schankerman (1997).
9provided by another …rm and the needs of a particular worker. The last
element implies that the cost will depend on the relative ”worker speci…city”
of the social assets provided by the …rm. For social provision of housing,
health care, child care, education, training and leisure goods, the speci…city
can be quite high and probably depends on the length of service of the worker
in his initial …rm12. During the transition, workers lack information about
the nature and the magnitude of these costs. We therefore consider that ¾ is
a random variable distributed on [0;¾] according to a cumulative G(:) with
G(¾) = 1.
For simplicity, we assume that each worker consumes a unit of social
services (which can be seen as a minimum consumption or social protection
level) and that the uncertainty he faces relates to the e¤ort needed to access
this unit consumption level.
3.1.3 Timing
Agents have to take certain decisions at the beginning of the period. The
timing of the sequential process of revelation of information is as follows.
First, workers learn their own productivity level a. Second, …rms, before
observing their shock and without knowing the exact productivity of each
individual, propose to their initial workers a (more or less implicit) contract
(w;s) composed of a …xed wage w and the provision of the social services
s:13
We assume, in conformity with the stylized facts of section 2.1, that
some institutional constraints hinder layo¤s and that voluntary separations
dominate workers’ out‡ows. The …rm can thus simply incite workers to leave
(or to stay) by o¤ering them a more or less attractive contract (through the
level of the contractual wage w):
Workers can accept or reject the o¤er. If they accept the contract, they
stay in the …rm and enjoy the social assets of the …rm. If they reject the
o¤er, they have to make a living outside their initial …rm by …nding a job on
12We assume, for simplicity, that when he quits, an employee looses access to the social
assets of his …rm. In reality, some workers retain access to some of the social assets of their
initial …rm. This is the case, in particular, for housing (Commander and Schankerman,
1997).
13In reality, the wages of the workers who decide to remain in the …rm are heteroge-
nous. This re‡ects the legacy of the past and also the possibility for …rms to discriminate
according to characteristics that are already observable.
10the competitive labour market.
At a third stage, the productivity a of all workers is revealed to all agents
in the economy (becomes common knowledge) and …rms also learn their own
idiosyncratic productivity shock A. After the shock, each …rm can go to the
spot labour market to hire more workers to maximise its pro…ts. Because
on the spot market all characteristics have been revealed, …rms now o¤er a
wage per e¢ciency unit of labour ! so that an individual with productivity
a is paid a total wage of !a.
3.1.4 Preferences
Each worker has a utility function u(c;s) de…ned on the two types of goods
of this economy: the consumption good c (taken as the numeraire) and the
social services s: As already noted, for simplicity, we consider that the con-
sumption of the social services is essential and that the social services are
supplied inelastically to each individual at the value s = 1. Therefore, the
relevant utility function can be rewritten as u(c) = u(c;1). Workers are risk
averse and u(c) is a Von Neuman Morgestern utility function with u0(c) > 0
and u"(c) < 0:
3.2 Labour contracts
Denote by !e the expectation of the wage paid per e¢ciency unit of labour
on the spot market. Then it is clear that a worker will accept the contract
at the …rst stage if and only if :
u(w) ¸
Z ¡
¾
0
u(!
ea ¡¾)dG(¾)
This means that the utility level he receives under the contract is higher
than the expected utility he would receive by leaving the …rm and facing the
uncertainty related to the provision of social services. As workers are risk
averse, they are ready to pay an insurance premium (accept a low wage w)
in order to avoid the outside uncertainty associated with the shifting cost ¾.
It is useful to de…ne this insurance premium I(y) that a worker with income
y is ready to pay to avoid the uncertainty associated with shifting from his
initial …rm to another one as:
11u(y ¡ I(y)) =
Z ¡
¾
0
u(y ¡¾)dG(¾)
Á(y) = y ¡ I(y) is then the certainty equivalent income which makes the
worker indi¤erent between going to the competitive labour market and expe-
riencing the risky adjustment cost ¾ and staying in the initial …rm without
this uncertainty. Clearly : Á
0(y) > 0 and Á(y) < y:
Given our assumption on the distribution of a, all workers with a produc-
tivity level a smaller than the threshold
a
¤(w;!
e) =
Á
¡1(w)
!e
accept the contract of their initial …rm. Hence, the number of workers
who want to remain in their initial …rm is l1 = l1(w;!e) given by :
l1 = l1(w;!
e) = Min fF(a
¤(w;!
e));l0g
Afterrevelation of theworkers’ productivity to the…rm, each …rm, through
a contract w; disposes of an amount of e¢cient contractual labour e L1 given
by:
e L1 = e L1(w;!
e) =
Z Minfa¤;ag
0
adF(a) = Minf©(a
¤(w;!
e));l0E(a)g
with E(a) = 1
F(a)
R a
0 adF(a)
and ©(a¤) =
R a¤
0 adF(a):
3.2.1 Firms’ expected pro…ts and optimal labour contract.
After realization of its idiosyncratic productivity shock, each …rm considers
if it wishes to employ more labour on the spot market. Given the Leontie¤
technology of production Q = MinfAK;lg; only those …rms with a labour
requirement AK larger than e L1 will want to hire additional labour on the
spot market. The ex post pro…t ¦(A;!e; e L1) of a given …rm thus depends on
12the realization of the shock A in the following way14
¦(A;!; e L1) = AK ¡ wl1 when A ·
e L1
K
= AK ¡ wl1 ¡!
e(AK ¡ e L1) when A >
e L1
K
Low productivity …rms (i.e. with A < e L1
K ) are content with their pool
of stable workers l1. On the contrary, high productivity …rms (i.e. with
A ¸ e L1
K ) have to hire at the anticipated market wage !e, the additional units
of labour (AK ¡ e L1) needed to maximise their pro…ts after the realization of
their productivity shock A.
From this we can compute the expected pro…ts of a …rm as a function
of the labour tying contract w it proposes and the expectation !e of the
equilibrium wage on the spot labour market as:
E¦(w;!
e) =
Z e L1
K
A
[AK ¡wl1]dH(A)+
Z A
e L1
K
[(1¡!
e)AK ¡wl1 +!
e e L1)]dH(A)
with the conditions15
l1 = l1(w;!
e) and e L1 = e L1(w;!
e)
This expected pro…t can be rewritten as:
E¦(w;!
e) =
Z A
A
AK(1 ¡!
e)dH(A) +
Z e L1
K
A
!
e[AK ¡ e L1]dH(A)
+(!
e ¡ w) e L1 + w
³
e L1 ¡l1
´
14The output good is also the numeraire consumption good and its price is …xed to 1:
15When writting the expression of the expected pro…t E¦(w;!e), we implicitely take
into account the fact that e L1
K takes a value between A and A. Obviously, it is never in the
interest of a …rm to havee L1
K > A since this would mean that the …rm hires useless units
of labour even under the best productivity shock A. It could be the case however that
e L1
K < A: In that case, the upper (resp. lower) bound of the …rst (resp. second) integral
on the LHS of this equation would have to be replaced by Min
n
e L1
K ;A
o
For notational
simplicity, we focus only on the most relevant case where e L1
K is larger than A:
13The …rst term re‡ects the expected pro…t ‡ows of the …rm if there were only
spot market contracts. The second term is negative and re‡ects the excess
cost, evaluated at the spot market wage, of hiring e L1 e¢cient units of labour
under the labour contract when the …rm faces a low productivity shock and
that ex post, it needs only AK units of labour. This term accounts for the
labour hoarding evoked in section 2.1. The third term (!e ¡ w) e L1 is positive
and re‡ects the labour costs savings for the …rm which has hired e L1 units of
labour at the contractual wage w rather than at the higher anticipated spot
market wage !e. Finally the last term w
³
e L1 ¡l1
´
can be either positive or
negative and depends on the shape of the distribution of workers’ skills. It
re‡ects the fact that under the labour tying contract, the …rm pays the same
wage w to all workers who accept the initial contract, regardless of their
productivity (which cannot be observed at this stage). Hence the …rm may
pay a wage rate in excess of their productivity to some of the less produc-
tive workers. But alternatively, it may underpay those relatively productive
workers who have chosen to remain in the …rm. In aggregate terms, the e¤ect
on the wage bill will depend on how the productivity level a of workers who
remain in the …rm is actually distributed.
It is a simple matter to see that:
@E¦
@e L1
= !
e
Ã
1 ¡ H(
e L1
K
)
!
;
@E¦
@l1
= ¡w;
@E¦
@w
= ¡l1
The problem of the …rm is then to choose w in order to maximise its
expected pro…ts E¦(w;!e): The solution of this problem gives the optimal
labour tying wage w(!e) as a function of the expected spot market wage !e:
It is actually more convenient to rewrite the pro…t function in terms of the
threshold level a¤ = a¤(w;!e); taking into account that w = Á(!ea¤) ¸ 0,
and to consider the …rm’s choice in terms of a¤: The …rst order condition for
an interior solution writes :
dE¦
da¤ = !
e
Ã
1 ¡ H(
e L1
K
)
!
a
¤F
0(a
¤) ¡ Á(!
ea
¤)F
0(a
¤) ¡ !
eF(a
¤)Á
0(!
ea
¤) = 0
(1)
for a¤ such that Á(!ea¤) ¸ 0 and e L1 = ©(a¤)16. Solving (1), we get
an equilibrium threshold a¤ = a¤(!e) and correspondingly a tying labour
16Note that this equation also holds for the case case where e L1
K < A by simply having
H(e L1
K ) = 0 in the expression.
14contract wage w = w(!e) = MaxfÁ(!ea¤(!e);0g:17
3.3 Spot labour market equilibrium.
Let us now describe the spot (short term contract) labour market equilib-
rium. The total labour demand on this market is simply the total demand
emanating from the …rms which have experienced a good productivity shock
(i.e.. a shock A higher than e L1
K ):
L
d =
Z A
e L1
K
[AK ¡ e L1)]dH(A) = K
"
E(A) ¡ ª(
e L1
K
) ¡
e L1
K
+
e L1
K
H(
e L1
K
)
#
with E(A) =
R A
A AdH(A) and ª(x) =
R x
A AdH(A).
The total labour supply is the total number of e¢cient units of labour
emanating from the workers who have rejected the initial contract :
L
s =
Z a
a¤ adF(a) = l0E(a) ¡ e L1
with E(a) = 1
F(a)
R a
0 adF(a)
The equilibrium spot labour market is given by Ld = Ls which gives the
following condition to be satis…ed by e L1:
l0E(a) = K
"
E(A) ¡ ª(
e L1
K
) +
e L1
K
H(
e L1
K
)
#
(2)
It is easy to see that the right hand side of this equation is an increasing
function of e L1
K : Under the assumption KE(A) < l0E(a) < KA, which we
assume to be satis…ed, it provides a unique solution e L¤
1 2
i
AK;AK
h
:
The labour market equilibrium fe L¤
1;a¤;!¤;w¤g is then characterized re-
cursively by (2) and
e L
¤
1 = ©(a
¤) (3)
!
¤
Ã
1 ¡ H(
e L¤
1 ¡ A
K
)
!
a
¤F
0(a
¤) ¡ Á(!
¤a
¤)F
0(a
¤) ¡!
¤F(a
¤)Á
0(!
¤a
¤) = 0 (4)
w
¤ = MaxfÁ(a
¤!
¤);0g (5)
17We assume that the second order conditions are satis…ed.
15As it is di¢cult to characterise the solution completely with general dis-
tribution functions, we consider in the next section a simple example with
uniform distributions for workers’ skills and …rms’ productivity, and a con-
stant absolute risk aversion of workers.
3.4 A uniform distribution example.
We have F(a) = a; and a = l0: Also H(A) = (A¡A)=¢A with ¢A = A¡A
with the assumption:
K
A + A
2
< l0
a
2
< KA
In that case
l1 = a
¤(w;!
e); e L1 =
(a¤(w;!e))2
2
The equilibrium fe L¤
1;a¤;!¤;w¤g is characterized by:
l0
a
2
= K
"
A+ A
2
+
1
2¢A
(
e L¤
1
K
)
2 +
A
2
2¢A
¡
A
¢A
e L¤
1
K
#
!
¤
Ã
1 ¡
e L¤
1
¢AK
!
a
¤ ¡Á(!
¤a
¤) ¡ !
¤a
¤Á
0(!
¤a
¤) = 0 with Á(!
¤a
¤) ¸ 0
and:
w
¤ = MaxfÁ(!
¤a
¤);0)
One interesting particular case is the case of a constant absolute risk
aversion utility function for workers (i.e.. u(C) = u0 ¡e¡°C): In that case, it
is easy to see that:
Á(y) = y ¡
1
°
Log
"Z ¾
0
e
°¾dG(¾)
#
= y ¡I
The insurance premium I(y) = I is independent from y.
From this, it is easy to see that the …rst order condition (1) writes:
!
¤
Ã
1 ¡
e L¤
1
¢AK
!
a
¤ ¡(!
¤a
¤ ¡I) ¡ !
¤a
¤ = 0 with !
¤a
¤ ¸ I
16As is clear from this equation, one cannot have the …rst order condition
satis…ed at an interior solution. Therefore !¤a¤ = I and w¤ = 0. Firms
o¤er, in that extreme case, a zero wage to the workers who choose the labour
contract.
The spot market wage !¤ then is established by the following equations:
l0
a
2
= K
"
A + A
2
¡
1
2¢A
(
e L¤
1
K
)
2 +
A
2
2¢A
¡
A
¢A
e L¤
1
K
#
with e L
¤
1 =
(a¤)2
2
and !
¤ =
1
°a¤Log
"Z ¾
0
e
°¾dG(¾)
#
This extreme example shows that in some cases, the …rm proposes a zero
contractual wage (which is the minimum it can …x). Even at this zero wage,
some employees will accept the contract and remain in the …rm. This is
because, given their low productivity or adaptation to the demand, they are
better o¤ keeping the access to the social assets of the …rm than receiving
the positive competitive wage !¤a of the spot market but facing the risk
associated with the shifting cost ¾:
3.5 Implications of the model for the segmentation of
the labour market
This model generates a number of predictions about the structure of the
labour market in Russia. First, it predicts an ex post segmentation pattern
for workers and …rms. In bad …rms (…rms which have a productivity shock
A smaller than A¤ =
e L¤
1
K ); there is a unique set of workers who remain in
their initial …rms, accept a labour contract and are paid w¤ (which can be
equal to 0) and enjoy the social asset at no cost. In good …rms (…rms which
have a productivity shock A higher than A¤ =
e L¤
1
K ) , there are two types
of workers: 1) low productivity workers (i.e. with a < a¤) who accept the
labour contract w¤ and the provision of social assets with no uncertainty; 2)
high productivity workers (i.e. with a ¸ a¤) who are paid according to their
market productivity a higher wage !¤a on the spot labour market18.
18De novo private …rms may employ only high productivity workers since their employ-
ment policy is not determined by the inherited pool of less productive workers. We only
consider the pool of …rms and employees who are present throughout the period. Workers
17According to the vision supported by the model, one should observe the
following signs of the segmentation process in the former state sector : (i)
The employment of the most productive workers should be more sensitive
to shocks than the employment of the less productive. In other words, the
adjustment variable of …rms is the employment of high-productivity workers.
(ii) In certain cases, in particular in the simple example developed in section
3.4, wages of low productivity workers should be less sensitive to local labour
market conditions than wages of high productivity workers. (iii) One should
observe more intra-…rm wage dispersion in …rms facing positive shocks than
in …rms facing negative shocks. The former will indeed have more high pro-
ductivity workers paid at their marginal productivity while low productivity
workers are paid a unique contractual wage. In the following section, we try
to check whether a large sample of Russian industrial …rms con…rms the …rst
two predictions. The last prediction cannot be directly veri…ed using our
database.
4 Empirical analysis
In order to test the predictions of the model, one would ideally like to use a
sample combining information on individuals (labour supply side) and …rms
(demand side)19. In spite of some attempts to match these two types of
information (Earle and Sabirianova, 1998), no such data set is available.
who leave their …rm for the newly created private sector are excluded from this picture. In
terms of our model, they can be viewed as having a productivity a greater than a: More-
over, we do not consider the possibility that workers can have a second job in the hidden
economy although this is an important part of the Russian reality. In the framework of
our model, the only di¤erence between a job on the spot market and on the shadow labour
market is that on the latter, the worker can both keep his job in his original state …rm
and use its social assets and get a better wage in the shadow economy. We simply assume
that there is a limit to the amount of time that the …rm would let the worker take out for
working on the shadow market, and we approximate this time to zero.
19Empirical studies of the Russian labour market usually hinge on the households sur-
veys such as the RLMS. On the labour demand side, data on hirings and separations
are collected by the Goskomstat, through mandatory regular reporting by medium and
large size enterprises which cover over 75% of total employment. However, in addition to
other drawbacks (ese Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1997), the declarations do not include any
economic information about the …rms. More fragmented information is also available. A
number of case studies are realized by Russian institutions (the Institute of Comparative
Labour Studies and the IMEMO : Institute of International Economic Relations ), the
OECD and the World Bank (see Denisova et al., 1998). Surveys of many enterprises are
18We use the Russian enterprise Registry data base, collected by the Russian
Statistical Committee (Goskomstat) on a compulsory and regular basis, in
order to study jointly …rms’ economic performance and labour dynamics,
even if it is clear that this source is far from satisfactory. From this data
set, we have extracted a panel of 13 410 …rms observed between 1993 and
1997. Among other indicators, the panel contains information about the
value of output, number of employees, wage fund, type of property, region
and product codes of each …rm20. We have eliminated observations with
inconsistent data and restrained the sample to those …rms for which we had
non-zero non-missing output, employment, and wage bill. We also eliminated
parts of consolidated …rms, mergers, subsidiaries, spun-o¤s and new entries.
The descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table A1 in the
Appendix.
Our purpose is to confront the vision of the labour market suggested by
the model with the information contained in the Registry. This information
allows for a limited and indirect veri…cation of the model, as it does not
distinguish workers according to their individual productivity, and does not
include gross ‡ows of hirings and separations.
We use the variation in the volume of …rms’ output as a proxy for their
idiosyncratic shocks : a …rm whose production expands has certainly faced
a favourable shock, whereas a …rm whose production contracts has probably
faced a negative productivity shock.
Although in the model the productivity of the employees follows a contin-
uous distribution, the ex post segmentation opposes two categories of work-
ers. The high productivity group whose parameter a is above the threshold
a*, and the low productivity group under a* (recall that a* is the threshold
that triggers the decision to quit the …rm or stay). In the Registry data,
the distinction is made between the number and wage fund of ”blue collars”
(production related) and ”white collars” (non production related) in each
…rm. In conformity with the stylized facts presented in section 2.2, we as-
sume that blue collar workers are the most demanded employees, while white
collar workers are the less adapted to the new market environment. To be
also conducted on a regular basis. The ”Russian Economic Barometer ”, TACIS-ACE
program of the European Commission, managed by a team of IMEMO, regularly polls
the managers of a panel of 251 …rms. More occasionally, the VCIOM (All Russian Public
Opinion Center), the ILO (International Labour O¢ce) or the Russian Labour Flexibility
Survey conduct surveys of enterprises.
20For the description of the registry data base see Brown and Brown (1997).
19sure, such a distinction does not encompass all aspects of high-productivity
versus low-productivity workers. However, because of the existing empirical
evidence quoted in section 2.2, we can take it as an acceptable approxima-
tion of the di¤erences between employees in terms of mobility and external
opportunities.
It may come as a surprise that blue collar workers are the most demanded
employees as opposed to white collar workers (Gimpelson and Lippoldt,
1997). In a Western economy, white collars would be thought to be more
quali…ed and adaptable. But in post socialist economies, white collar workers
might just have the wrong skills. People specialised in administration and
management tasks may have been formed to the needs of the former system
(e.g. they could have a comparative advantage in relations with the plan
organs and the administration of the branch ministry) and be poorly suited
to the new tasks of a market environment. It may also be that there remains
some complementarity between the installed capital and the blue collars that
are trained to use it, which creates the excess demand for quali…ed workers.
In the following regressions, we try to …nd tracks of the segmentation of
the market between blue collars and white collars, assuming that the former
are the high productivity group and the latter the least productive.
4.1 Employment and shocks
Table 1 compares the sensitivity of the employment of white collar versus
blue collar workers, to shocks. In order to control for sectoral and regional
speci…cities, we include as explanatory variables, the average growth rate of
employment in the …rm’s industry and region21.
As expected, the response of the growth rate of employment of blue collar
workers to shocks is signi…cantly stronger than that of white collar workers.
The same result is obtained when regressions are estimated by OLS or …xed
e¤ects and when we separate the sample between …rms with increasing and
decreasing output.
[Table 1 about here]
These results suggest that …rms are indeed adjusting to their shocks by
variating the number of blue collars rather than white collars. Ideally, one
21The average growth rates are calculated on the basis of our sample, without the
restrictions imposed for the construction of the panel.
20would like to …nd that the variation in the numberof lowproductivity workers
is independent from the shocks of the …rm (i.e. a non signi…cant parameter).
The imperfection of the categories (white/blue collar workers) used to ac-
count for the productivity or adaptation of workers is probably responsible
for the signi…cance of the coe¢cient.
The higher responsiveness of production related workers to output vari-
ation is not a surprising result per se. It is a common observation of the
literature on labour market. The reason is usually that production related
workers are a more easily ”divisible” resource, whereas accountants, clerks
etc. perform tasks that are much less dependent on the level of activity of
the …rm, hence their lower elasticity to output. However, in the case of Rus-
sia, this cannot be taken as the explanation since, as noticed in section 2.1,
labour layo¤s are extremely rare and separations are essentially voluntary.
4.2 Wages and the local labour market
In certain cases, in particular in the example of section 3.2, we expect the
wages of blue collar workers to be more sensitive to the local labour market
conditions than the wages of white collar workers. Table 2 presents the test of
this prediction. The real wage growth of blue collar workers and white collar
workers are regressed on the respective average real wage growth in the region
and in the industry. The results show that local labour market conditions
have signi…cantly more in‡uence on the wages of blue collar workers than on
the wages of white collar workers. In particular, the coe¢cient of regional
wage growth is twice as strong for blue collar workers as for white collar
workers.
This is in line with the logic of the model whereby blue collar workers
are more sensitive to external opportunities (their wage follows more closely
the local market alternative wage) and less dependent on the social assets
provided by their initial …rm. In the model, they are less frequently willing
to accept the initial contract o¤ered by the …rm.
[Table 2 about here]
5 An interpretation of wage arrears
In the framework of our model, pervasive wage arrears can be interpreted
as an element of the contract between …rms and employees. Russian …rms
21are indeed constrained by two types of institutional limits. The …rst one
is the di¢culty to …re workers. The second re‡ects the in‡uence of the
o¢cial wage schedule (razriad). In the public sector, individual wages are
based on the o¢cial minimum wage multiplied by a coe¢cient re‡ecting the
formal quali…cation of the employee. In the private sector, wage setting is
in principle free from this constraint. In fact, it is highly in‡uenced by the
wage schedule prevailing in the public sector (Denisova et al., 1998). This
implies that it is di¢cult for a …rm to pay openly di¤erent nominal wages
to formally identical employees. We suggest that …rms use wage arrears as a
device to di¤erentiate the real wages e¤ectively paid to their employees, i.e.
to di¤erentiate contractual wages from market competitive wages.
It is simple to see that at the threshold level, the initial contractual wage
is inferior to the competitive market wage (w¤ < !¤a¤ ) because of the
shifting cost. Many low productivity workers therefore tend to receive low
wages and are discriminated compared to productive workers. A low level
of e¤ectively paid wage, set in the framework of an implicit contract, can
result in systematic and recurrent wage arrears being directed towards the
low productivity workers.
Wage arrears can thus be viewed as part of an implicit contract between
employees and the …rm. In this view, wage arrears are fully anticipated. We
believe indeed that it is not realistic that wage arrears come as a surprise to
employees when they systematically touch the same individuals, period after
period.
According to our interpretation, wage arrears are independent of the …-
nancial situation of the …rms 22. They are not an ex post adjustment of wages
to an observed performance ; on the contrary, they are determined ex ante
by the …rm together with the nominal wage proposed in the contract. Under
this view, the term !¤e L¤
1 ¡wl1 can be interpreted by an outside observer as
the total wage arrears in a given …rm. It re‡ects the di¤erence between the
total wage bill !¤e L¤
1 which would have to be paid on the spot market for
the l1 ”unproductive” workers inside the …rm and the actual wage bill wl1
paid to these workers. From equations (3), (4) and (5), it is easy to see that,
as !¤ and a¤ do not depend on the ex post realised productivity value A of
22Alfandari and Scha¤er (1996) …nd that wage arrears are not correlated with …rms’
performance. They interpret wagearrears as a device used by managers to extract subsidies
from the government. On the other hand, Earle and Sabirianova (1998) consider that wage
arrears re‡ect …rms’ bad performance ( …rms survive by accumulating payments arrears
instead of going bankrupt).
22a typical …rm, this term !¤e L¤
1 ¡ wl1 is also independent from the realiza-
tion of A: Hence, under this interpretation, wage arrears should not depend
on the idiosyncratic realisation of …rms’ productivity shocks. Wage arrears
should however be higher in …rms where low-productivity workers are more
numerous since these workers are the main destination of arrears.
Are the enterprise data consistent with this interpretation? To look at
this issue, we use a sub-sample of the Goskomstat Registry for which we
have balance sheets of the enterprises and which includes information on
cumulated wage arrears (”overdue wage payments”) for 6722 enterprises in
1996 and 3109 enterprises in 1997. (The descriptive statistics of the sam-
ple are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix). As far as we know, wage
arrears have not been analysed until now using such a large …rm level data
base. In order to use fully this cross section information we present separate
regressions for 1996 and 1997. The results are presented in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 shows that wage arrears are independent from …rms’ performance
measured by pro…tability (de…ned as the ratio of pro…ts to output). This also
con…rms that wage arrears are signi…cantly higher in …rms who employ more
white collar workers23. This is consistent with our view that wage arrears are
predominantly addressed to the less productive employees, proxied by white
collar workers.
The fact that the coe¢cient of regional unemployment is positive and
signi…cant is consistent with the assumption that the labour contract is in-
‡uenced by the local labour market conditions: the employees accept lower
wages (of which wage arrears are an integral part) if the prospects outside
the …rm are bad. It should be noted that large …rms have more wage arrears
than small and medium ones. This can be explained by the fact that large
…rms have more social assets (section 2.1), hence more white collar workers
ready to accept the contract.
6 Conclusion
This study has shown that the Russian labour market is increasingly divided
into a stagnant pool of less productive people, and a dynamic segment of
23We obtained similar results when the endogenous variable was de…ned as wage arrears
per employee instead of the share of wage arrears in the …rm’s wage fund.
23mobile, more productive workers employed in …rms with relatively good per-
formance. More productive workers contract on the competitive segment of
the labour market, whereas less productive workers engage in contractual
relationships with …rms, that are similar to risk insurance contracts whereby
employees exchange the access to social services against reduced real wages.
The implications of this segmentation phenomenon in terms of restruc-
turing are ambiguous. On the one hand, it re‡ects some adjustment of the
industrial sector, namely dynamic employment policy of some …rms and ef-
…cient reallocation of the most productive workers. On the other hand, if
restructuring means reducing overmanning, then the process is far from be-
ing completed in Russia. There is a risk that this stagnant segment exerts
an eviction e¤ect on the dynamic sector, in particular if it receives State
subsidies in order to perform this role of social protection. The presence of
social assets in former State …rms also increases the entry cost of de novo
…rms. De facto, many newly created private …rms do propose social services
to their employees (Estrin et al., 1995). This constraint certainly slows down
the development of the new private sector.
This peculiar segmentation of the labour market is due to the weakness
of the institutional construction. The segmentation of the Russian labour
market is above all linked to the high level of uncertainty that surrounds
the perspectives of workers and …rms. In terms of the model presented in
section 3, the real Russian speci…city, compared to other transition countries,
or to market economies, is the uncertainty associated with the shifting cost
¾: We believe that uncertainty is more important in Russia because of the
weaker institutions and the more ‡uctuating macroeconomic policy. Firms’
budget constraint is not as hard in Russia as in Central European countries.
This is attested by the continuation of government subsidies and, above all,
by the generalised payments arrears that characterise the Russian economy
(inter-enterprise arrears, bank arrears, tax arrears and wage arrears, see Per-
otti, 1998, Earle and Sabirianova, 1998, Ivanova and Wyplosz, 1998). The
weakness of the State and of the rule of law and the slow pace of institution
building in Russia shorten the time horizon of agents and weaken the quality
of their expectations.
The reduction of uncertainty thus constitutes a key condition of the ”nor-
malization” of the situation, and of the separation of unproductive employees
from their …rm. This means that a social protection system independent of
the …rms, and providing reliable services in terms of quantity and quality,
should be created. In order to deal with the risk aversion of employees, it is
24also possible to try to reduce the irreversibility of the separations. In China,
for instance (Fan et al., 1998), a recent decree allows employees of the state
sector who …nd new jobs in the private sector, to come back to their initial
job if they wish, during a period of two years. Any policy of this type, that
alleviates the irreversibility and uncertainty attached to employees’ decisions
would certainly help unlocking the situation.
Training and quali…cation programs can also improve the opportunities
of employees on the labour market, and facilitate separations. Let us recall
that the blue collar workers currently seem to enjoy better job opportunities
than white collar workers. This is due to the peculiar skills of white collar
workers who are better suited to the old system of bureaucratic coordination
than to the new market environment, as well as to resilient technical com-
plementarities between the installed physical capital and quali…ed workers.
This situation could be misleading if it were interpreted as durable. It could
indeed be reversed as soon as …rms start replacing their old capital and in-
vesting in new technologies, and when white collar workers are adequately
trained.
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